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Hydrofracking:  
State Preemption, Local Power, 
and Cooperative Governance 
John R. Nolon† & Steven E. Gavin ‡ 
Abstract 
Advocates for the gas drilling technology known as hydraulic fracturing, 
or hydrofracking, argue that it will bring significant economic benefits to 
the private and public sectors. Its opponents dispute these claims and 
point to significant environmental and public health risks associated 
with hydrofracking—risks that must be considered in adopting 
government regulations needed to protect the public interest. One of 
the many issues raised by hydrofracking is which level of government 
should regulate which aspects of the practice. This debate is 
complicated by the fact that the risks associated with hydrofracking 
raise concerns of federal, state, and local importance and fit within 
existing regulatory regimes of each of these levels of government. This 
Article begins by describing the limited aspects of hydrofracking that 
are currently regulated by the federal government, which leaves many 
of the risks unaddressed, opening the door for state and local 
regulation. This Article describes the legal tension between state and 
local governments in regulating hydrofracking in the four states that 
contain the immense Marcellus shale formation. Its particular focus is 
on court decisions that determine whether local land use regulation, 
which typically regulates local industrial activity, has been preempted 
by state statutes that historically regulate gas drilling operations. This 
investigation suggests that the broad scope and durability of local land 
use power as a key feature of municipal governance tends to make 
courts reluctant to usurp local prerogatives in the absence of extraordi-
narily clear and express language of preemption in state statutes that 
regulate gas drilling. The Article concludes with an examination of how 
the legitimate interests and legal authority of all three levels of 
government can be integrated in a system of cooperative governance. 
 
† John R. Nolon is Professor of Law at Pace Law School and Counsel to 
the Land Use Law Center, and has been an adjunct professor at the 
Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies since 2001.  
‡ Steven E. Gavin is a student at Pace Law School and editor in chief of 
the Pace Environmental Law Review. 
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Introduction: Hydrofracking Raises Jurisdictional Issues 
Hydraulic fracturing, or hydrofracking, is a gas well stimulation and 
extraction technique designed for areas underlain by large shale 
formations found often a mile or more below the surface. Vertical 
hydrofracking has been done for decades, but relatively recent 
technology enables directional drilling, which allows the drill stem and 
borehole to follow the horizontal structure of the shale formations and 
proceed thousands of feet to exploit gas reserves far from the well 
head.1 In horizontal hydrofracking, millions of gallons of water are 
pumped at high pressure into the well bore—water that contains 
thousands of gallons of proprietary chemical slurries and a propping 
agent, such as sand.2 The pressure creates fractures in the hydrocarbon-
 
1. Marianne Levelle, Forcing Gas Out of Rock with Water, Nat’l 
Geographic Daily News (Oct. 17, 2010), http://news.nationalgeo 
graphic.com/news/2010/10/101022-energy-marcellus-shale-gas-science-tec 
hnology-water. 
2. Between one million and five million gallons, or more, of water are 
needed for a typical gas well in the Marcellus shale. Michele Rodgers 
et al., Marcellus Shale: What Local Government Officials 
Need to Know 5 (2009), available at http://pubs.cas.psu.edu/ 
freepubs/pdfs/ua454.pdf. About 99.5% of this fluid is composed of water 
and proppant (usually sifted sand) and about 0.5% consists of chemical 
additives. See Groundwater Prot. Council, Modern Shale Gas 
Development in the United States: A Primer 61–62 (2009), 
available at http://www.gwpc.org/sites/default/files/Shale%20Gas%20 
Primer%202009.pdf (noting that chemicals used include biocides, gels, 
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bearing shale and the propping agent keeps the fissures open.3 This 
releases the natural gas that the shale contains and allows it to be 
pumped to the surface.4 Some of the fluid mixture, known as “flowback 
water,” returns to the surface, where it is either trucked off site to 
injection wells or released into water treatment facilities.5 This raises 
complications in some states, particularly those in the Marcellus region, 
where the geology is not favorable to injection wells.6 This, in turn, 
leads to a search for appropriate injection wells in other states and for 
treatment plants that can handle this wastewater, which are often in 
short supply.7 Horizontal hydrofracking operations also emit volatile 
organic compounds and methane during the completion of the wells, 
raising both public health and climate change concerns.8 Additional air 
pollution is caused by the thousands of truck trips that each well may 
generate—trips that require improved or new roads, that can cause 
landscape fragmentation, and that create congestion, noise, and the 
need for expensive road repairs, thus burdening local tax payers.9 
Advocates for the gas drilling industry argue that hydrofracking 
will bring significant economic benefits to the private and public 
 
friction reducers, and other agents that reduce corrosion, thus easing the 
process of hydrofracking the shale). For a graphic representation, see A 
Fluid Situation: Typical Solution Used in Hydraulic Fracturing, Energy 
in Depth, http://www.energyindepth.org/frac-fluid.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2013). 
3. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, Revised Draft, 
Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement on 
the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Program 5-5 
(2011) [hereinafter Revised Draft SGEIS], available at http:// 
www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf; John A. Harper, The 
Marcellus Shale—An Old “New” Gas Reservoir in Pennsylvania, 38 Pa. 
Geology 1, 10 (2008), available at http://www.dcnr.state.pa.us/cs/ 
groups/public/documents/document/dcnr_006811.pdf. 
4. See Revised Draft SGEIS, supra note 3, at 5-5 (describing how 
hydrocarbons are retrieved after fluids are injected and recovered). 
5. See id. at 5-131 (noting the disposal options for flowback water). 
6. Joanna Zelman, New York Fracking Debate Focuses on Wastewater, 
HuffPost Green (Feb. 20, 2012 8:27 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2012/02/20/new-york-fracking_n_1288696.html (“Other geologists 
have said New York doesn’t have the right geology for such wells.”). 
7. See Revised Draft SGEIS, supra note 3, at 5-132 to 5-133.  
8. Press Release, EPA, EPA Proposes Air Pollution Standards for Oil and 
Gas Production (July 28, 2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress. 
nsf/1e5ab1124055f3b28525781f0042ed40/8688682fbbb1ac65852578db0069
0ec5!OpenDocument. 
9. See Revised Draft SGEIS, supra note 3, at 6-303 (estimating that 
each permitted well generates about 6,800 truck trips). 
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sectors.10 The opponents of hydrofracking dispute these claims and 
point to environmental and public health risks associated with 
hydrofracking—risks that must be considered in government 
regulation needed to protect the public interest. The debate on both 
sides yields differing projections of supplies, jobs created, tax 
revenues, water needed, wastewater created, and the extent of 
groundwater and surface water pollution. Hydrofracking’s proponents 
and opponents argue over the effect of hydrofracking on community 
character, climate change, the nation’s balance of payments, and 
whether or not it will help the United States become less dependent 
on oil imports or retard the development of renewable energy sources.  
Those who object to hydrofracking point also to a variety of 
environmental risks that they fear are associated with the technology: 
air pollution, groundwater depletion and contamination, surface-water 
pollution, soil erosion and sedimentation, visual blight, noise pollution, 
road congestion and destruction, and the deterioration of community 
character.11 They worry as well about a variety of public health 
concerns, including escaped methane and other volatile organic 
compounds, exposure to ground-level ozone causing respiratory illness, 
chemical fires, lung disease in workers caused by the inhalation of silica 
dust, benzene pollution of the air near drilling sites, particulate matter 
from heavy trucks travelling on dirt roads, personal injury from seeping 
hydrochloric acid and solvents, earthquakes, and diesel fuel and toxic 
chemicals in ground water.12 
One of the many issues raised by hydrofracking is which level of 
government should regulate which aspects of the practice. This debate 
is complicated by the fact that the benefits associated with hydro-
fracking are national, regional, statewide, and local in nature and that 
the risks associated with hydrofracking raise concerns that are within 
the existing legal jurisdiction of federal, state, and local government. 
These realities lead, in turn, to further debates about which level of 
government should have the primary role in regulating hydrofracking; 
indeed, some argue that the federal government should fully preempt 
the field of hydrofracking regulation, others argue that states should 
 
10. See Jared B. Fish, Note, The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing: A 
Behavioral Analysis of Landowner Decision-Making, 19 Buff. Envtl. 
L.J. 219, 265 (2012) (noting that entry of the natural gas industry can 
bring jobs to communities and produce quick financial gains for 
landowners). 
11. See Revised Draft SGEIS, supra note 3, at 2-9 to 2-19.  
12. See Charlotte Tucker, Health Concerns of ‘Fracking’ Drawing Increased 
Attention, Nation’s Health, Mar. 2012, at 1, 14, available at 
http://thenationshealth.aphapublications.org/content/42/2/1.2.full (noting 
the EPA’s public health concerns related to hydrofracking); see generally 
Revised Draft SGEIS, supra note 3 (providing a detailed accounting 
of the airborne chemicals detected at well sites, water quality measures, 
seismic activity, traffic effects, and health risks). 
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preempt local regulation, and some see benefits in the involvement of 
all three levels of government in regulating the technology.13  
If the advocates of either federal or state preemption prevail, the 
historical role of local governments in controlling local land uses and 
their impacts will be diminished, if not extinguished.14 Local govern-
ments are created by and derive their powers from the state. They get 
the power to adopt land use plans and regulations through state 
planning and zoning enabling acts and home-rule statutes. If the state 
legislature expressly and in certain terms preempts using that delegated 
power in order to promote a state interest such as gas exploration, the 
power of local government is clearly trumped. Where state legislatures 
do not expressly preempt local zoning, or where their intention to do so 
is ambiguous, it is the job of the courts to determine whether localities 
are preempted. Courts may find that, by implication, state legislatures 
 
13. See Christopher S. Kulander, Shale Oil and Gas State Regulatory Issues 
and Trends, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1101, 1140 (2013) (“[W]hat is 
being derided as a weakness is actually a strength: each state can 
rapidly respond to its unique blend of economic, political, hydrological, 
and geological realities to achieve realistic and functional regulatory 
oversight. A further weakness alleged by those favoring federal primacy, 
that states are ‘rushing’ to create law regulating fracing, is also a 
strength: the necessary regulations are made in a timely manner, in 
response to industry activity, and by those more familiar with the 
challenges faced by an individual state.”). 
14. The law of preemption is fraught with ambiguity, giving courts leeway 
to embrace different policies and achieve different results, given the 
context. The Supremacy Clause can be relied upon to support federal 
dominance, or the Tenth Amendment to support strong state control; 
jurists can dissect language in federal or state statutes that seems to 
express an intent to preempt and still decide that the matter under 
investigation is not preempted because some aspect of the field regulated 
is not dealt with in the statutory scheme. When local governmental 
power is the issue, home-rule statutes and fundamental powers of local 
government can be relied upon to argue against state law preemption; in 
Dillon’s Rule states, this is more difficult, but the Rule is declining in 
popularity, and more liberal interpretations of local power are emerging 
giving more sway to statutes that delegate power to localities. This 
leeway in the law of preemption gives both parties to disputes over legal 
power opportunities to make their best case for control of the matter at 
hand. This Article posits that those favoring local control over 
hydrofracking have a good case because of the complexity, 
comprehensiveness, and importance of local land use control in the 
critical matter of municipal governance. The authors credit Michael 
Allan Wolf, Richard E. Nelson Chair in Local Government Law, 
University of Florida, Levin College of Law, for this insight, which was 
offered during his introductory remarks at the 2013 Nelson Symposium. 
Professor Wolf urged that scholars and lawyers should embrace this 
ambiguity and make their best case for their desired result in each 
instance. The argument for a presumption against preemption of local 
land use control is the authors’ own. 
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intended to preempt local power. Implied preemption may be based on 
the court finding direct conflicts between general state legislation and 
local zoning controls (conflict preemption) or by finding that the state 
legislative scheme is so comprehensive that it intended to occupy the 
field (field preemption).  
In most states, zoning is one of several powers delegated to local 
governments to serve local and state interests. Zoning determines how 
property is used, developed, and how valuable it will be; localities 
have the power to impose property taxes on the land they regulate 
and they are expected to use those revenues to fund municipal 
operations, provide municipal infrastructure, and carry on the 
business of local government, which benefits local citizens and the 
state in multiple ways. Given the complexity, comprehensiveness, and 
utility of these linked powers and duties, the judiciary is rightfully 
cautious about implying that state regulatory enactments, such as 
those regulating hydrofracking, were intended by the legislature to 
inhibit local prerogatives. The importance of local land use regulation 
leads to a presumption against preemption that must be overcome to 
convince most state judges that, in adopting oil and gas laws, state 
legislatures intended to preempt local zoning. 
This Article begins in Part I by describing the aspects of 
hydrofracking that are currently regulated by the federal government, 
which leaves many of the risks untouched for future federal regulation 
or for state and local governments to consider. Parts II, III, and IV 
describe the legal tension between state and local regulation in the 
four states that contain the immense Marcellus shale formation: New 
York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio. These Parts focus on 
court decisions that determine whether local regulation to protect the 
interests, typically governed by land use planning and zoning, have 
been preempted by state law delegating regulation of the gas industry 
to one or more state agencies. This investigation suggests that the 
broad scope and durability of local land use power tends to make 
courts reluctant to usurp local prerogatives in the absence of clear and 
express language of preemption in gas regulation statutes. The Article 
concludes in Part V with an examination of how the legitimate 
interests and legal authority of all three levels of government can be 
integrated in a system of cooperative governance. 
I. Limited Scope of Current Federal Regulations 
Several federal statutes apply, either directly or theoretically, to 
hydraulic fracturing. But the sprawling federal regulatory structure is 
rife with ambiguity and is in a state of flux. Mounting political 
pressure from environmental groups, citizen-activists, academia, and 
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even Hollywood15 is forcing federal authorities to explore new avenues 
of regulation within the existing regulatory structure.16 Countervailing 
pressures, however, from conservative members of Congress, industry 
lobbyists, and environmentalists who advocate for state and local 
authority, are trying to strip the EPA of its authority or, at a 
minimum, contain it. 
Born out of the statutes discussed in the subsections below, the 
current federal regulatory system is both fragmented and incomplete. 
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), which applies to the injection 
or reinjection of hydrofracking fluid into groundwater aquifers that 
provide drinking water, only imposes standards upon drilling 
operations injecting diesel fuel, just one of myriad concerns 
surrounding the technology.17 The Clean Water Act (CWA), which 
applies to surface water contamination, is powerless to address the 
potential contamination resulting from water migrating to the surface 
waters after being injected into the ground.18 The Clean Air Act 
(CAA) is currently being used to institute new rules on the release of 
methane and hazardous air pollutants, but the scope of this relatively 
successful regulatory scheme is confined to the well pad point source.19 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) grants the EPA the authority to hold 
polluters strictly liable for cleanup costs of hazardous waste sites, but 
“petroleum . . . [and] natural gas” are exempted from the definitions 
of “hazardous substances.”20 Likewise, oil and gas waste is exempted 
from the “cradle-to-grave” waste management scheme of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).21 The Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) grants the Secretary of the Interior the power to protect 
endangered species from “take,” but this approach is rarely used and 
entirely contingent upon the regional concerns regarding particular  
15. Mark Fischetti, Matt Damon’s Fracking Movie Depicts Gas Companies 
as Liars, Sci. Am. (Jan. 6, 2013), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/ 
observations/2013/01/06/matt-damons-fracking-movie-depicts-gas-compa 
nies-as-liars. 
16. In the absence of legislative action, President Obama appears poised to 
push federal hydrofracking regulations during his second term. See 
Wayne J. D’Angelo, Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in President 
Obama’s Second Term, Fracking Insider (Nov. 13, 2012), http:// 
www.frackinginsider.com/hydraulic-fracturing-regulation-in-president-obam 
as-second-term (noting that the Obama administration is surveying the 
regulatory authority it has within existing statutes and assessing how to 
issue rules under those statutes). 
17. See discussion infra Part I.A.  
18. See discussion infra Part I.B.  
19. See discussion infra Part I.C.  
20. See discussion infra Part I.D.  
21. See discussion infra Part I.E.  
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species.22 The Obama administration partially granted a petition to 
require manufacturers to disclose the chemical makeup of 
hydrofracking fluids under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 
but even if fully granted, these disclosures do not necessitate any 
regulation in and of themselves.23 
A. Safe Drinking Water Act 
Enacted in 1972, the Safe Drinking Water Act is designed to ensure 
the integrity and safety of public water for human consumption, focus-
ing particularly on toxic substances.24 The SDWA establishes two 
primary regulatory structures to maintain safe public drinking water, 
the first of which requires the EPA to set maximum contaminant levels 
for public water systems.25 The second, which applies to hydrofracking, 
mandates that the EPA establish regulatory minima governing 
underground injection, and prohibits “underground injection” of fluids 
without a permit.26 This pertains directly to hydrofracking operations, 
which involve the underground injection of millions of gallons of water 
containing proppants and proprietary chemicals. 
The SDWA establishes an Underground Injection Control program 
(UIC), which establishes “inspection, monitoring, recordkeeping, and 
reporting requirements” designed to protect drinking water sources 
from contamination due to injection operations.27 The extent to which a 
particular site is regulated depends on which of five classifications it 
receives.28 The UIC sets minima for “inspection, monitoring, 
recordkeeping, and reporting requirements.”29 States must implement 
their own UIC programs, meeting or exceeding the requirements set by 
the EPA.30 After the EPA approves the state UIC program, the state is 
 
22. See discussion infra Part I.F.  
23. See discussion infra Part I.G.  
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26. 
25. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-1(a)–(b) (mandating the promulgation of national 
primary drinking water regulations and maximum contaminant level 
goals). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(A). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(C)–(b)(2). 
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-5 (directing the EPA to promulgate regulations 
and determine the applicability of monitoring methods to provide the 
earliest possible detection of fluid migration into underground sources of 
drinking water); 40 C.F.R. § 146.5(a)–(e) (2012) (describing the five 
classes of injection wells in the UIC program).  
29. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(C); see also 40 C.F.R. § 145 (covering state UIC 
program requirements). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(b)(1)(A). 
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responsible for its enforcement.31 The EPA, however, retains veto power 
over the state permitting program.32 
The fight over the EPA’s authority to regulate hydrofracking 
under the SDWA has a relatively long legislative history, beginning 
with the Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. v. EPA 
(LEAF) decision of 1997.33 In LEAF, the plaintiff challenged the 
EPA’s decision to approve the Alabama state UIC program, which 
failed to regulate hydraulic fracturing operations.34 In 1997, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the plain meaning of the SDWA 
“require[d] the regulation of all [underground injection] activities.”35  
Following this 1997 ruling, the EPA conducted a study of the 
hydrofracking process in order to determine whether the risks were 
sufficient to warrant regulation under the SDWA.36 In a 2003 
negotiated agreement with the EPA, Halliburton Energy Services, BJ 
Services, and Schlumberger Technology voluntarily agreed “to 
eliminate diesel fuel in hydraulic fracturing fluids injected into coalbed 
methane . . . production wells in underground sources of drinking 
water (USDWs).”37  
In 2004, the EPA’s study on potential impacts on USDWs found 
that injection of hydrofracking fluids posed “minimal threat to 
USDWs,” yet admitted that certain chemicals sometimes used in 
hydrofracking operations caused some “environmental concerns.”38 
Following the 2004 study, Congress passed the notorious Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, containing the “Halliburton Loophole,” in 
 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(b)(3). 
32. See id. (permitting the EPA to promulgate a rule finding that a given 
state no longer meets the requirements of the program).  
33. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 
1997). The Eleventh Circuit noted that an EPA report on hydraulic 
fracturing identified a “growing potential for contamination of drinking 
water aquifers.” Id. at 1471 (quoting from a 1990 report by the EPA’s 
Ground Water Study Committee). 
34. Id. at 1469.  
35. Id. at 1475. 
36. Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing 
in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 
Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 115, 144 (2009). 
37. Memorandum of Agreement Between the EPA and BJ Servs. Co., 
Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., and Schlumberger Tech. Corp., at 2 
(Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw000/uic/pdfs/ 
moa_uic_hyd-fract.pdf. 
38. EPA, Evaluation of Impacts to Underground Sources of 
Drinking Water by Hydraulic Fracturing of Coalbed 
Methane Reservoirs (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/og 
wdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_final_fact_sheet.pdf. 
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response to heavy lobbying efforts from the oil and gas industry.39 The 
Act amended the SDWA’s definition of “underground injection” to 
exclude “the underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other 
than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related 
to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities.”40 Thereafter, states 
were no longer required to seek permits before engaging in drilling 
operations as part of their UIC programs, with the exception of when 
diesel fuel was injected.41 
Efforts to remove the loophole have been, thus far, unfruitful. The 
most salient attempt by the federal government to address 
hydrofracking concerns was the Fracturing Responsibility and 
Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011 (FRAC Act). Proposed in both 
the U.S. Senate42 and House,43 the FRAC Act would impose federal 
regulation in two ways. First, the Amendment would repeal the 
hydrofracking exemption to the SDWA. It would modify “underground 
injection” to include “the underground injection of fluids or propping 
agents pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or 
geothermal production activities.”44 The EPA would then have to 
promulgate “inspection, monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting 
requirements” for hydrofracking operations.45 State UIC programs that 
did not require a permit before commencing hydrofracking operations 
would have to modify their UIC programs to require permits and then 
seek EPA approval.46 Additionally, the Act would have required 
hydrofracking operators to disclose hydraulic fracturing chemicals.47 
The FRAC Act faced staunch opposition from the oil and gas industry, 
 
39. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006)). 
40. Id.  
41. Id.  
42. S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011). Pennsylvania Senator Robert Casey Jr., a 
Democrat, sponsored the bill along with seven original cosponsors. The 
bill went to the Senate Committee on Environmental and Public Works. 
On April 12, 2011, the Subcommittee on Water and Wildlife held a 
hearing on the bill. 
43. H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (2011). Representative Diana DeGette, a 
Democrat from Colorado, sponsored the bill along with thirty-one 
original cosponsors. On March 21, 2011, the bill was referred to the 
House Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy. 
44. H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011); see also S. 587, 112th Cong. 
§ 2(a) (2011) (using slightly different language to reach the same 
outcome as the House bill). 
45. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text (describing the 
requirements for UIC programs). 
46. Id.  
47. H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. § 2(b) (2011); S. 587, 112th Cong. § 2(b) (2011). 
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from members of Congress, and from some environmental groups that 
wanted regulatory decisions to be made by local and state governments. 
Both the House and Senate bills died at the expiration of the 112th 
Congress in January 2013 and have yet to be reintroduced in the 
113th Congress. 
B. Clean Water Act 
Working in conjunction with the SDWA’s regulations regarding 
underground sources of drinking water, the CWA48 is designed to 
“eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters” and to 
attain a level of water quality that “provides for the protection and 
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation 
in and on the water.”49 Hydrofracking involves the potential point 
source discharge of flowback waters produced during drilling 
operations into nearby surface waters, among other techniques of 
disposal. The CWA prohibits the discharge of “point source” pollution 
into the “waters of the United States”50 without obtaining a permit 
under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES).51 Like it does with the SDWA, the EPA generally grants 
permitting authority to states under their respective State Pollution 
Discharge Elimination Systems (SPDES) but reserves the right to 
institute a federal program in the event that the state fails to submit 
an adequate program.52 States are required to consider “technology-
based effluent limitations” and water-quality-based limits to achieve 
water quality goals.53 The CWA also regulates indirect discharge of 
wastewater by truck or through sewer systems into publicly owned 
 
48. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).  
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
50. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 230.3(p), (s) (2012) (defining discharges from point 
sources and permits, “pollution,” and “waters of the United States”).  
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5), (b) (2006) (“The Administrator shall authorize a 
State, which he determined has the capability of administering a permit 
program which will carry out the objectives of this chapter to issue 
permits for discharges into the navigable waters within the jurisdiction 
of such state.”). 
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c).  
53. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (“[E]ffluent limitations . . . shall require 
application of the best available technology economically 
achievable . . . .”); § 1312(a) (effluent limitations “shall assure [the] 
protection of public health, public water supplies, agricultural and 
industrial uses, and the protection and propagation of a balanced 
population of shellfish, fish and wildlife, and allow recreational activities 
in and on the water”); see also 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(a) (2012) 
(“Technology-based treatment requirements . . . represent the minimum 
level of control that must be imposed in a permit.”). 
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treatment works (POTW), which discharge directly into U.S. 
waters.54 
While surface water discharges have been successfully regulated 
under the CWA,55 it is unlikely that drillers will need to obtain an 
NPDES permit until a “solid causal connection can be made between 
fracking fluid injection and injuries to people and property.”56 
Nevertheless, the CWA is the primary source of authority governing 
the disposal and treatment of flowback water.57 In many western states, 
drillers dispose of flowback water in storage wells below layers of 
impermeable rock, but the particular geological properties of the 
Marcellus formation make comparable disposal practices physically or 
economically impossible.58 Accordingly, hydrofracking companies are 
much more likely to dispose of flowback fluid through POTWs in the 
Marcellus region than in other areas of the country.59 POTW disposal 
implicates SPDES permits, since they are regulated point sources of 
potential pollutants. 
C. Clean Air Act 
Hydrofracking operations involve the emission of a variety of 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and methane: pollutants that are 
harmful to public health and worsen climate change.60 The CAA61 
grants the EPA the authority to regulate emissions from stationary 
sources such as gas wells.62 With respect to emissions from 
 
54. Attachment to memorandum from James Hanlon, Dir. of the EPA’s 
Office of Wastewater Mgmt., to the EPA Regions, Natural Gas Drilling 
in the Marcellus Shale NPDES Program Frequently Asked Questions, at 
6 (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/hydro 
fracturing_faq.pdf. 
55. Jason Obold, Leading by Example: The Fracturing Responsibility and 
Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011 as a Catalyst for International 
Drilling Reform, 23 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 473, 486 (2012) 
(“The CWA has been successful at regulating the surface activities of 
hydraulic fracturing operations . . . .”). 
56. Id. 
57. Rebecca Jo Reser & David T. Ritter, State and Federal Legislation and 
Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, Advocate: Tex. State Bar 
Litig. Section Report, Winter 2011, at 31, 32. 
58. Id. at 32 n.16. 
59. Id. 
60. See Revised Draft SGEIS, supra note 3, at 7-46 (defining VOCs and 
how they affect hydrofracking operations). 
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006).  
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (“The term ‘stationary source’ means any 
building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any 
air pollutant.”). 
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hydrofracking operations, the EPA has the authority to demand 
reductions in Hazardous Air Pollutants63 and VOCs,64 including 
methane.65 The CAA sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) and seeks nationwide attainment through both technology-
based and health-based standards.66 
On April 17, 2012, the EPA created the first national air quality 
standards for hydraulically fractured natural gas wells, designed to 
reduce harmful emissions while allowing for responsible industrial 
growth.67 These rules require compliance with new emissions 
standards for natural gas hydrofracking wells, storage tanks, and 
other oil and gas equipment, to be achieved through the use of 
“proven technologies and best practices that are in use today.”68 The 
EPA anticipates that these regulations, when fully effective, will 
achieve a 95 percent reduction of VOCs from new or modified wells, 
accomplished through a process known as “green completion,” which 
utilizes specialized machinery to separate gas and liquid hydrocarbons 
from flowback fluid.69 The EPA claims that the new rules will provide 
the oil and gas industry with savings of up to $15 million in 2015,70 
 
63. EPA, Overview of Final Amendments to Air Regulations for 
the Oil and Natural Gas Industry 4, available at http://www. 
epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417fs.pdf [hereinafter Overview 
of Air Regulation Amendments] (“EPA also must set standards for 
emissions of air toxics, also called hazardous air pollutants. Air toxics 
are pollutants known or suspected of causing cancer and other serious 
health effects.”). 
64. Id. (“The Clean Air Act requires EPA to set new source performance 
standards (NSPS) for industrial categories that cause, or significantly 
contribute to, air pollution that may endanger public health or welfare. 
EPA is required to review these standards every eight years. The 
existing NSPS—for VOCs and SO2—were issued in 1985.”). 
65. Id. at 2 (“Methane, the primary constituent of natural gas, is a potent 
greenhouse gas—more than 20 times as potent as carbon dioxide when 
emitted directly to the atmosphere. Oil and natural gas production and 
processing accounts for nearly 40 percent of all U.S. methane emissions, 
making the industry the nation’s single largest methane source.”). 
66. 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2012) (setting National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for six principal pollutants: carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen 
dioxide, ozone, particulate pollution, and sulfur dioxide). 
67. Overview of Air Regulation Amendments, supra note 63, at 1. 
68. Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards, EPA, http://www.epa. 
gov/airquality/oilandgas (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
69. Overview of Air Regulation Amendments, supra note 63, at 1. 
70. Id. (“EPA’s analysis of the rules shows a cost savings of $11 to $19 
million when the rules are fully implemented in 2015.”). The oil and gas 
industry largely contests these economic projections and expresses 
concern about overregulation. “While we understand that EPA is 
required by law to periodically evaluate current standards, this sweeping 
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created by the recovery of gas and condensate that would have 
otherwise been lost.71 The EPA requires that all extraction companies 
be in compliance with “green completion” requirements by January 1, 
2015.72 Meanwhile, companies are required to utilize combustion 
devices, or “flaring,” to reduce their carbon emissions.73 
D. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act 
CERCLA grants the EPA authority to require the cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites.74 CERCLA creates a federal “Superfund” to 
support remedial actions taken by government entities, and establishes 
a process by which federal and state governments, along with private 
parties, can bring suit against “potentially responsible parties” (PRPs) 
for the release of a “hazardous substance.”75 
CERCLA explicitly excludes “petroleum, including crude oil . . . 
natural gas, [and] natural gas liquids” from the definition of “hazardous 
substance.”76 Despite the “petroleum exception,” the EPA may have 
authority to impose future liability upon oil and gas drillers for 
remediation costs for contamination because hydrofracking fluid 
contains nonpetroleum substances.77 Although the current regulatory 
scope under CERCLA is ambiguous, it is clear that the EPA possesses 
the authority to conduct investigations under CERCLA, at the very 
least, and may be authorized to regulate nonpetroleum pollution under 
 
set of potentially unworkable regulations represents an overreach that 
could, ironically, undercut the production of American natural gas, an 
abundant energy resource that is critical to strengthening our nation’s 
air quality.” Press Release, Marcellus Shale Coalition, Kathryn Z. 
Klaber, MSC Statement on Proposed EPA Air Regulations (July 28, 
2011), http://marcelluscoalition.org/2011/07/msc-statement-on-proposed 
-epa-air-regulations. 
71. Overview of Air Regulation Amendments, supra note 63, at 2. 
72. EPA, Summary of Key Changes to the New Source 
Performance Standards 1, available at http://www.epa.gov/air 
quality/oilandgas/pdfs/20120417changes.pdf. 
73. Id.; see also Timothy Gardner & Ayesha Rascoe, Fracking Rules Let 
Drillers Flare Till 2015, Reuters (Apr. 18, 2012, 4:31 PM), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/18/us-usa-fracking-emissions-idUSBRE 
83H0UH20120418. 
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), 9607(a); see also EPA, PRP Search Manual 
(Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/resources/ 
publications/cleanup/superfund/prpmanual/prp-search-man-cmp-09b.pdf. 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). 
77. John C. Martin et al., Fractured Fairy Tales: The Context and Regulatory 
Constraints for Hydraulic Fracturing, in Development Issues in Major 
Shale Plays 3-1, 3-13 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. 2010). 
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the same act.78 The difficulty of determining the chemical makeup of 
hydrofracking fluids may preclude the EPA from determining the 
requisite nonpetroleum or hazardous classification of the fluid. This 
difficulty can be overcome by an EPA requirement that gas drilling 
companies disclose the chemicals used so that the agency can properly 
discharge its regulatory functions under CERCLA. 
E. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act  
Passed by Congress in 1976, the RCRA grants the EPA the 
authority to regulate all aspects of hazardous waste generation, 
transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal.79 RCRA is 
complimentary to CERCLA: the former is a preventative “cradle-to-
grave” statute and the latter is a remedial statute. Among other 
related requirements, RCRA creates disclosure and safety standards 
meant to encourage the reduction of such waste and the use of 
nontoxic alternatives.80 RCRA also established a national framework 
to manage nonhazardous solid wastes and underground storage 
tanks.81 Subchapter III of RCRA grants the EPA authority to 
establish safeguards and waste management procedures to regulate 
and prevent hazardous wastes.82  
Congress and the EPA reached an agreement in 1988 to exempt 
oil and gas from RCRA regulation in response to heavy industry 
lobbying efforts.83 Subchapter III of RCRA explicitly exempts wastes 
generated from oil and gas exploration and production84 and imposes 
 
78. See id. (discussing the EPA’s “investigative authority” during a 
hydraulic fracturing incident in Pavillion, Wyoming). 
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2006). 
80. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922(b) (discussing waste minimization programs); see 
also EPA, RCRA: Reducing Risk From Waste 2 (Sept. 1997), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/osw/inforesources/pubs/risk/risk-1.pdf 
(“The primary goals of RCRA are to: Protect human health and the 
environment from the potential hazards of waste disposal. Conserve 
energy and natural resources. Reduce the amount of waste generated. 
Ensure that wastes are managed in an environmentally sound manner.”). 
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941–6949a (“State or Regional [nonhazardous] Solid 
Waste Plans”); § 6991 (“Regulation of Underground Storage Tanks”). 
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939g (“Hazardous Waste Management”). 
83. Jennifer Dixon, EPA Said to Bow to Political Pressure in Oil Wastes 
Ruling, Associated Press (July 19, 1988, 12:49 AM), available at 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1988/epa-said-to-bow-to-political-pressure 
-in-oil-wastes-ruling/id-87790d67435a0ba3eb1e5ecc5ce86c9c. 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2) (“[W]astes associated with the exploration, 
development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or geothermal 
energy shall be subject only to existing State or Federal regulatory 
programs.”). 
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strict standards upon transporters.85 This exemption was originally a 
temporary measure set by Congress but became permanent after the 
EPA, at Congress’s urging, conducted a study that determined that 
regulation of oil and gas wastes was unwarranted under RCRA.86 
Thus, although hydrofracking fluids may contain toxic chemicals 
ordinarily regulated under RCRA, the EPA lacks the authority to 
regulate them.87 
F. Endangered Species Act 
Additional federal authority to regulate hydrofracking may be 
contained in the ESA.88 Passed in 1973, the ESA was designed to 
protect both endangered and threatened species, as well as the 
habitats on which they depend.89 The ESA requires the Secretary of 
the Interior, advised by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service, to give the “highest priority” to 
protecting endangered species.90 The Secretary of the Interior has the 
authority to list all terrestrial and freshwater species as either 
“endangered” or “threatened,” and the Secretary of Commerce has 
the equivalent authority for marine life.91 All species listed as 
“endangered” and most species listed as “threatened,” or “likely to 
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future,”92 are 
protected from “take”93 by public or private actors.94 Federal agency 
 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 6923 (“Standards applicable to transporters of hazardous 
waste.”). 
86. Clarification of the Regulatory Determination for Wastes from the 
Exploration, Development and Production of Crude Oil, Natural Gas 
and Geothermal Energy, 58 Fed. Reg. 15,284 (Mar. 12, 1993) (“[T]his 
document only further clarifies the status of these wastes under the 
RCRA . . . hazardous waste exemption . . . and does not alter the scope 
of the current exemption in any way.”). 
87. In spite of legislative inaction, the Obama administration is set to 
review petitions to apply RCRA to produced waters and hydrofracking 
fluid. See D’Angelo, supra note 16. 
88. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)  
90. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978) (“[E]xamination of the language, 
history, and structure of the [ESA] indicates beyond doubt that 
Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of 
priorities.”). 
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)–(2). 
92. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20). 
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (“The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, 
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage 
in any such conduct.”). 
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actions are not permitted to “take” or jeopardize any listed species, 
not only by autonomous agency actions but also by permitting actions 
of others95—a universal need with respect to hydraulic fracturing. 
Additionally, the wildlife agencies designate “critical habitats” for 
each endangered or threatened species listed in the Federal Register, 
specifying the range of the particular species.96 Agencies or permitted 
parties are prohibited from engaging in, funding, or authorizing any 
action that would modify, adversely affect, or destroy a designated 
habitat.97 The Secretary is required to conserve and protect an 
endangered or threatened species until the species is no longer 
endangered or threatened.98 
The fragmentation of the natural landscape caused by road 
building, heavy road use, pipeline construction, and surface-water 
pollution may constitute “take” of endangered species, which might be 
preventable through enforcement of the ESA provisions. In fact, many 
of the most heavily fracked areas of the country contain some of the 
most endangered species.99 The Secretary of the Interior might be able 
 
94. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (stating that “taking” endangered animals is 
“unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”). 
Similar to the ESA, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act protects migratory 
bird species from deliberate or incidental “take.” 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 
(2006). Although the Migratory Bird Treaty Act does not contain a 
provision to protect a particularized habitat, it imposes strict liability 
upon any person for the death of a migratory bird, even if the death 
occurs as a result of the bird drinking water from a legal retaining pond. 
See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he 
statute does not include as an element of the offense ‘wilfully, knowingly, 
recklessly, or negligently.’ . . . Congress recognized the important public 
policy behind protecting migratory birds; FMC engaged in an activity 
involving the manufacture of a highly toxic chemical; and FMC failed to 
prevent this chemical from escaping into the pond and killing birds. This 
is sufficient to impose strict liability on FMC.”). 
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see also Hill, 437 U.S. at 173 (“One would be 
hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer 
than those in . . . the Endangered Species Act. Its very words 
affirmatively command all federal agencies ‘to insure that actions 
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the 
continued existence’ of an endangered species or ‘result in the 
destruction or modification of habitat of such species.’ ” (quoting 16 
U.S.C. § 1536)). 
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)–(B) (requiring use of the “best scientific data 
available” when determining a species’s critical habitat). 
97. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).  
98. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 261 (9th 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Nevada v. Hodel, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985). 
99. See Press Release, American Rivers, Upper Delaware Named America’s 
Most Endangered River (June 2, 2010), available at http://www. 
americanrivers.org/newsroom/press-releases/2010/teton-river-most-endang 
ered-2010-6-2-2010.html (discussing how hydrofracking around a national 
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to use the ESA to minimize the effect of hydrofracking on protected 
species.100 Indeed, the mere potential of listing the sagebrush lizard of 
New Mexico afforded Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar the 
leverage necessary to secure “unprecedented commitments to 
voluntary conservation agreements” with the oil and gas industry.101  
G. Toxic Substances Control Act 
TSCA grants the EPA authority to require companies to report the 
health, safety, and exposure information of chemical substances and 
mixtures to the EPA.102 On November 23, 2011, the Obama 
administration partially granted a section 21 petition from Earthjustice103 
requesting a rulemaking under sections 4 and 8, which would require 
manufacturers and processors to disclose chemical mixtures used during 
all hydrofracking operations and to conduct toxicity testing on named 
chemicals.104 The petition cited numerous federal regulatory “gaps,” or 
oil and gas exemptions in the SDWA and RCRA, and demanded 
 
park system near the Upper Delaware River is contaminating the water 
and threatening “several endangered, at risk, or rare species liv[ing] in the 
river and along its banks”). 
100. Kalyani Robbins, Awakening the Slumbering Giant: How Horizontal 
Drilling Technology Brought the Endangered Species Act to Bear on 
Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1143 (2013). 
101. Following the Fish and Wildlife Service’s proposal to list the dune 
sagebrush lizard in December 2010, the state governments of Texas and 
New Mexico, private landowners, and oil and gas companies developed 
an unprecedented 650,000-acre conservation plan to preserve the 
shinnery oak dune habitat of the lizard. Upon the required “best 
available science” analysis, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar stated that 
the lizard faces no imminent threat of becoming endangered. The 
Service will continually monitor the progress and efficacy of the 
conservation efforts, retaining the right to reevaluate the listing 
determination at any time. News Release, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 
Landmark Conservation Agreements Keep Dunes Sagebrush Lizard Off 
the Endangered Species List in NM, TX (June 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/Documents/R2ES/NR_for_DSL_Fi
nal_Determination_13June2012.pdf. 
102. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2006) (including the authority under 
section 2603 to require premanufacture notice for “new chemical 
substances,” and the authority under § 2607 to regulate “inventory” 
chemicals). 
103. Petition from Earthjustice to EPA, Citizen Petition under Toxic 
Substances Control Act Regarding the Chemical Substances and 
Mixtures Used in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production (Aug. 4, 
2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/chemtest/pubs/Section_ 
21_Petition_on_Oil_Gas_Drilling_and_Fracking_Chemicals8.4.2011.pdf.  
104. Eric Waeckerlin & Joe Green, Hydraulic Fracturing & TSCA: EPA’s 
Surprising Move and Its Sweeping Implications, Legal Backgrounder, 
Feb. 24, 2012, at 1. 
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further federal oversight on disclosure for chemicals used in 
hydrofracking operations.105 Although the EPA claims that the new 
rulemaking will “complement” current state disclosure requirements, 
the interplay between the proposed rule and state or other federal 
regulations is yet to be seen.106 
II. New York: Localities Win Round One,  
Escaping Preemption107  
The legislature in New York, like those in most states where 
hydrofracking occurs, has adopted comprehensive legislation to regulate 
oil and gas operations. As opposed to the federal government, whose 
jurisdiction is somewhat constrained by its limited jurisdiction over 
matters of property, state governments have plenary authority to 
regulate their resources. The legislatures of all fifty states have also 
created local governments and given them legal authority of various 
types, including the power to adopt comprehensive plans, zoning, and 
other land use regulations. Under that authority, localities typically 
regulate industrial land uses, such as gas drilling operations, by either 
prohibiting them altogether or assigning them to appropriate areas 
within their jurisdiction where the intensity of industrial activities 
does not adversely affect neighboring property values or the quality of 
life in other parts of the community.  
New York’s oil and gas statute contains language that at first 
blush seems to preclude the regulation of hydrofracking under local 
land use authority. The New York Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law 
(OGSML)108 provides that  
[t]he provisions of this article shall supersede all local laws or 
ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution 
mining industries; but shall not supersede local government 
jurisdiction over local roads or the rights of local governments 
under the real property tax law.109  
Industry attorneys, of course, read this language as expressly 
preempting local land use control of the location and local impacts of 
 
105. Id. at 2. 
106. The Obama administration is also set to review petitions for increased 
hydrofracking regulation under RCRA, the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), and the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). See D’Angelo, supra note 16.  
107. Portions of this Part are adapted from John R. Nolon & Victoria 
Polidoro, Hydrofracking: Disturbances Both Geological and Political: 
Who Decides?, 44 Urb. Law. 507 (2012). 
108. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 23-0303 (McKinney 2012). 
109. Id. § 23-0303(2). 
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gas wells. Some localities, whose lawyers interpret the language 
differently, have enacted various controls on the location of gas wells 
to protect the integrity of their land use plans and their local 
environment. Landowners and the industry, in turn, have sued two 
towns that banned gas drilling by amending their local zoning 
ordinances.110 Both communities won their cases in the lower courts, 
which found neither express nor implied preemption of local control of 
hydrofracking in the OGSML.111 Deciding the underlying issues in 
these cases will take years as they wind their way through the New 
York court system.  
The holdings of these first decisions are consistent with the 
general understanding of local control and state preemption in New 
York. Zoning authority can be curtailed when the state has 
demonstrated the intent to preempt an entire field of regulation.112 
This prevents inconsistent local laws from “inhibit[ing] the operation 
of the State’s general law and thereby thwart[ing] the operation of the 
State’s overriding policy concerns.”113 The intent to preempt can be 
explicit or can be implied through review of the state’s regulatory 
scheme regarding a particular subject.114  
Article IX, section 3(c) of the New York Constitution, however, 
provides that “[r]ights, powers, privileges and immunities granted to 
local governments by this article shall be liberally construed.”115 This 
constitutional requirement has also been codified by section 51 of the 
Municipal Home Rule Law, which provides that home-rule powers 
“shall be liberally construed.”116 These requirements of liberal 
construction apply to towns’ powers to enact zoning laws, which are 
 
110. New York law delegates essentially the same degree of land use power to 
three of the four types of local government that the state has created: 
villages, towns, and cities. References in this Article to “towns” refer to 
all three of these types of localities, unless the reference is to a 
particular community. Counties in New York are considered to be local 
governments but do not have the authority to adopt zoning. 
111. Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 474 
(Sup. Ct. 2012); Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 
943 N.Y.S.2d 722, 730 (Sup. Ct. 2011). New York’s Supreme Court is 
the state’s trial-level court of general jurisdiction. 
112. See Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. 
1987) (“A local law may be ruled invalid . . . where the State has clearly 
evinced a desire to preempt an entire field thereby precluding any 
further local regulation.”). 
113. Id. at 906. 
114. See id. at 907 (holding that no preemption existed because the 
regulatory department did not think the statute was meant to preempt 
local legislation). 
115. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 3(c).  
116.  N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 51 (McKinney 2012). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Hydrofracking: State Preemption, Local Power, and Cooperative Governance 
1015 
derived not only from specific delegations of power contained in the 
Town Law,117 but also the Municipal Home Rule Law.118 The state’s 
highest court has recognized that “[o]ne of the most significant 
functions of a local government is to foster productive land use within 
its borders by enacting zoning ordinances.”119 These provisions calling 
for liberal interpretation of local power and extolling the importance 
of local land use powers create an implicit presumption against 
preemption. 
The crux of the conflict between state and local power over gas 
drilling in New York involves the interpretation of the term “regulation” 
in the OGSML. If zoning laws, which regulate the use of land by, and the 
location of, gas drilling facilities, are viewed as laws “relating to the 
regulation of” the industry, they are preempted by the language of the 
OGSML.120 If not, municipalities may use their zoning powers to identify 
appropriate locations in the community for such drilling and impose 
standards to mitigate local impacts of hydrofracking, or, in proper 
instances, to prevent hydrofracking altogether.  
When faced with a potential conflict between state and local zoning 
laws, New York courts attempt to harmonize local and state legislative 
enactments, “thus avoiding any abridgment of the town’s powers to 
regulate land use through zoning powers expressly delegated” in the 
constitution and implemented through state statutes.121 It is well settled 
that “[t]he mere fact that a state regulates a certain area of business 
does not automatically pre-empt all local legislation which applies to 
that enterprise.”122 
 
117. See N.Y. Town Law §§ 261–263 (McKinney 2012) (granting town 
boards the power to regulate the size, style, density, and use of 
structures for a variety of purposes); see also N.Y. Gen. City Law 
§ 20(24)–(25) (McKinney 2012) (granting this power to cities); N.Y. 
Village Law §§ 7-700, 7-702 (McKinney 2012) (granting this power to 
the board of trustees of a village); Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of 
Upper Brookville, 414 N.E.2d 680, 682 (N.Y. 1980) (noting the 
delegation of zoning power to village boards). 
118. See, e.g., Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 351 (N.Y. 1989) 
(recognizing towns’ power to enact zoning rules pursuant to section 10 
of the Municipal Home Rule Law); Pete Drown, Inc. v. Town Bd. of 
Ellenburg, 591 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (App. Div. 1992) (same).  
119. DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d. 186, 191 (N.Y. 
2001). 
120.  N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2012). 
121. Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920, 924 
(N.Y. 1987). 
122. Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone, 447 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222 (Sup. Ct. 
1982), aff’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 1982), motion for leave 
denied, 444 N.Y.2d 1013 (N.Y. 1982). 
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The New York courts have experience looking at the distinction 
between zoning laws and laws that regulate business operations, 
including mining. The state’s Mined Land Reclamation Law (MLRL) 
contained the following preemption provision, which is similar to the 
language found in the OGSML:  
For the purposes stated herein, this title shall supersede all 
other state and local laws relating to the extractive mining 
industry; provided, however, that nothing in this title shall be 
construed to prevent any local government from enacting local 
zoning ordinances or other local laws which impose stricter 
mined land reclamation standards or requirements than those 
found herein.123  
In Frew Run Gravel Products, Inc. v. Town of Carroll, the court 
found that the legislature, in enacting the MLRL, did not intend to 
preempt the provisions of a town zoning law that limited the areas of 
town where sand and gravel mines could be established.124 In making 
its determination, the court conducted a three-part inquiry, looking 
first at the plain language of the statute, followed by the legislative 
history, and then finally to the purpose and intent of the statute.125 
Looking at the plain meaning of the phrase “relating to the extractive 
mining industry,” the court “[could not] interpret the phrase . . . as 
including the Town of Carroll Zoning Ordinance.”126 The purpose of a 
zoning ordinance is to regulate land use, and in doing so, it 
“inevitably exerts an incidental control over any of the particular uses 
or businesses which, like sand and gravel operations, may be allowed 
in some districts but not in others.”127 The court found that this type 
of incidental control through zoning was “not the type of regulatory 
enactment relating to the ‘extractive mining industry’ which the 
Legislature could have envisioned as being within the prohibition of 
the statute.”128 In so finding, the court recognized the difference 
between a zoning law and “[l]ocal regulations dealing with the actual 
operation and process of mining[, which] would frustrate the statutory 
purpose of [the MLRL’s standardized regulations].”129  
 
123. Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921 (citing N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 23-
2703(2)).  
124. See id. at 923 (“There is nothing in the Mined Land Reclamation Law 
or its history indicating . . . the preemptive effect petitioner urges.”). 
125. Id. at 922. 
126. Id.  
127. Id.  
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 923. 
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In August 2011, the Town of Dryden amended its zoning 
ordinance to prohibit natural gas drilling.130 The ordinance added 
definitions for “Natural Gas,” “Natural Gas and/or Petroleum 
Exploration,” and “Natural Gas Exploration and/or Petroleum 
Production Wastes,” and then prohibited the “Exploration for or 
Extraction of Natural Gas and/or Petroleum” anywhere in the 
town.131 The law also purports to invalidate any “permit issued by 
any local, state[,] or federal agency, commission[,] or board for a use 
which would violate the prohibitions of” the ordinance.132 
The Town of Middlefield’s land uses are predominately 
agriculture, forests, and low-density residential. After studying the 
potential impact of heavy industry on its rural environs and water 
supply,133 in June 2011 it amended its comprehensive plan and zoning 
law to prohibit heavy industry throughout the town. Heavy industry 
is broadly defined and includes “drilling of oil and gas wells” as well 
as “chemical manufacturing,” “petroleum and coal processing,” and 
“steel manufacturing.”134  
The Town of Dryden’s law was challenged by Anschutz 
Exploration Corporation, a Colorado-based driller and developer of 
natural gas wells. The Town of Middlefield’s law was contested by 
Cooperstown Holstein Corporation, a local dairy operation that has 
 
130. See Minutes, Town of Dryden Special Town Board Meeting, at 1, 5–15 
(Aug. 2, 2011), available at http://dryden.ny.us/Board_Meeting_ 
Minutes/TB/2011/TB2011-08-02.pdf (voting 5–0 in favor of amendments 
“clarifying the town’s prohibition of natural gas exploration and 
extraction”). 
131. Notice, Town of Dryden Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Zoning 
Ordinance, at 1, 2 (Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://documents.food 
andwaterwatch.org/doc/Frack_Actions_DrydenNY.pdf (“No land in 
the Town shall be used: to conduct any exploration for natural gas 
and/or petroleum; to drill any well for natural gas and/or petroleum; to 
transfer, store, process or treat natural gas and/or petroleum; or to 
dispose of natural gas and/or petroleum exploration or production 
wastes; or to erect any derrick, building, or other structure; or to place 
any machinery or equipment for such purposes.”). 
132.  Id. 
133. See Greenplan, Inc., Land Use Analysis: Heavy Industry And 
Oil, Gas or Solution Mining and Drilling 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.otsego2000.org/documents/forwebsiteMiddlefieldLandUseAnaly
sis-Greenplan.pdf (a land use analysis prepared for the Town Board of 
the Town of Middlefield that provides information on the potential 
effects of zoning amendments). 
134. Middlefield, N.Y., The Town of Middlefield Zoning Law, Local Law No. 
1, art. II, § B(8) (2011), available at http://www.middlefieldny.com/ 
uploads/1/2/6/8/12682437/zoning_law_061411_2011_final.pdf.  
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leased approximately 400 acres of its land for natural gas 
development.135  
On February 21, 2012, the New York Supreme Court, Tompkins 
County, upheld the Town of Dryden’s total ban on hydrofracking 
within its borders.136 The court’s holding was straightforward: “In 
light of the similarities between the OGSML and the MLRL as it 
existed at the time of Matter of Frew Run, the court is constrained to 
follow that precedent in this case.”137 The court found that the 
OGSML did not expressly preempt local zoning and that the town’s 
zoning amendment did not regulate gas production; rather, it 
regulated land use and not the operation of gas mining.  
The court noted that “[n]one of the provisions of the OGSML 
address traditional land use concerns, such as traffic, noise or industry 
suitability for a particular community or neighborhood.”138 It cited 
other preemptive statutes with provisions requiring the relevant state 
agency to consider the traditional concerns of zoning in deciding 
whether a permit is to be issued. “Under this construction, local 
governments may exercise their powers to regulate land use to 
determine where within their borders gas drilling may or may not take 
place, while [the Department of Environmental Conservation] regulates 
all technical operational matters on a consistent statewide basis in 
locations where operations are permitted by local law.”139 The provision 
of the local law that invalidated any other permits authorizing drilling 
was found invalid as preempted by the OGSML and was severed from 
the law, while the other provisions were left in place. 140 
Three days later, on February 24, 2012, the Supreme Court in 
Otsego County issued a decision in the Middlefield case granting 
summary judgment in favor of Middlefield, upholding the town’s 
zoning law that banned natural gas drilling.141 After thoroughly 
reviewing the legislative history of the OGSML, the court found no 
provision in it to support Holstein’s position, stating, 
 
135. Verified Complaint at 1–2, Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of 
Middlefield, 943 N.S.Y.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (No. 2011-0930), available 
at http://catskillcitizens.org/learnmore/VsTownOfMiddlefield.pdf.  
136. Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 474 
(Sup. Ct. 2012). 
137. Id. at 466. 
138. Id. at 470. 
139. Id. at 471. 
140. The court found that the provision could be severed without impairing 
the underlying purpose of the zoning amendment. Id. at 474. 
141. Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722, 
730 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
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Neither the plain reading of the statutory language nor the 
history of [the OGSML] would lead this court to conclude that 
the phrase “this article shall supersede all local laws or 
ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution 
mining industries” was intended by the Legislature to abrogate 
the constitutional and statutory authority vested in local 
municipalities to enact legislation affecting land use.142 
In the court’s analysis of the legislative history of the ECL, it 
found that the intention of the legislature was not to preempt the 
statutory authority vested in local municipalities to enact legislation 
affecting land use.143 Rather, the legislature’s intent was to impose 
uniform statewide oversight to ensure and promote efficient utilization 
of a state resource.144 The court analyzed the policy of the state at the 
time of original enactment of article 3-A of the Environmental 
Conservation Law in 1963.145 It found that the provisions “fail to 
specifically address therein any land use issues which would otherwise 
be the subject of a local municipality’s zoning authority as an exercise 
of its police powers.”146 Rather, it concluded that the legislation 
focused the Department of Conservation’s (now the Department of 
Environmental Conservation, or DEC) efforts on matters that were 
“regulatory in nature,” such as spacing units, integration of oil and 
gas pools and fields, oil and gas leases, and the plugging of old 
wells.147 The court also relied on case law interpreting the “strikingly 
similar” provision of the MLRL, which found that “in the absence of a 
clear legislative intent to preempt local control over land use, the 
[MLRL] could not be read as preempting local zoning authority.”148 
Of singular importance in the Middlefield decision is the court’s 
understanding of the state legislature’s intent when it initially 
adopted the Environmental Conservation Law in the early 1960s. At 
that time, local zoning was forty years old and had been preceded by 
decades of adopting local nuisance abatement laws prior to the advent 
of zoning. It seems imprinted in the mind of the legislature to protect 
local control, except where the legislature expressly states that 
preemption of local prerogatives is essential to furthering overriding 
state interests. In the Dryden and Middlefield decisions, the judiciary 
 
142. Id. at 728 (quoting N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 23-0303(2)).  
143. Id.  
144. Id. at 728–29. 
145. Id. at 724–26.  
146. Id. at 725. 
147. Id. at 729 (quoting Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 
664 N.E.2d 1226, 1234 (N.Y. 1996)). 
148. Id. 
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in New York followed its trend to harmonize two legislative regimes—
one intended to impose uniform regulations on the operation of gas 
drilling and the other designed to control local land use impacts, 
honoring the statutes that delegate extensive land use control to 
towns as well as the home-rule provisions of the State Constitution 
that promise localities control over their local property, affairs, and 
government. 
The assessment by the two lower courts in Dryden and 
Middlefield of the legislative history and preemptive effect of the 
OGSML was affirmed by the Third Department Appellate Division on 
May 2, 2013, when it upheld both opinions.149 In affirming the Dryden 
decision by the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division made it clear 
that “zoning ordinances are not the type of regulatory provision that 
the Legislature intended to be preempted by the OGSML”;150 that 
“the Legislature’s intention was to insure uniform statewide standards 
. . . in an effort to increase efficiency while minimizing waste”;151 and 
that “nothing in the language, statutory scheme or legislative history 
of the statute indicat[es] an intention to usurp the authority 
traditionally delegated to municipalities to establish permissible and 
prohibited uses of land within their jurisdictions.”152 By distinguishing 
the purposes of land use regulation from “regulating the actual 
operation, process and details of the oil, gas and solution mining 
industries, ‘the statutes may be harmonized, thus avoiding any 
abridgment of [a] town’s powers to regulate land use through zoning 
powers expressly delegated in the Statute of Local Governments . . . 
and the Town Law.’”153 
It was not lost on the court that the matters regulated by the state 
under the OGSML are not the matters traditionally regulated by 
municipal zoning and land use regulations. Provisions of the OGSML 
“do not address traditional land use considerations, such as proximity 
 
149. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, No. 515227, slip op. at 15 
(N.Y. App. Div. May 2, 2013) (“Thus, we hold that the OGSML does 
not preempt, either expressly or impliedly, a municipality’s power to 
enact a local zoning ordinance banning all activities related to the 
exploration for, and the production or storage of, natural gas and 
petroleum within its borders.”); Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of 
Middlefield, No. 515498, slip op. at 3 (“For the reasons set forth in 
Matter of Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, we find 
plaintiff’s claim to be without merit and affirm Supreme Court’s 
judgment declaring that defendant’s zoning is valid.” (citation 
omitted)). 
150. Dryden, slip op. at 8.  
151. Id. at 10–11.  
152. Id. at 11.  
153. Id. (quoting Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 
N.E.2d 920, 924 (N.Y. 1987) (alterations in original)).  
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to nonindustrial districts, compatibility with neighboring land use, and 
noise and air pollution . . . . [T]he zoning law will dictate in which, if 
any, districts drilling may occur, while the OGSML instructs operators 
as to the proper spacing of the units within those districts in order to 
prevent waste.”154 These decisions ratify the importance of local control 
of hydrofracking and of identifying methods of state-local coordination 
as recommend in Part V.  
III. Pennsylvania: Preemption Thwarted 
The tension between local and state control of hydrofracking 
evident in New York is profoundly evident in recent legislative and 
judicial decisions in Pennsylvania—the state in the heart of the 
Marcellus region.155 Under prior state oil and gas law, the state courts 
had determined that local governments could regulate but not prevent 
hydrofracking under local zoning. Following these judicial decisions, 
the state legislature adopted Act 13, which all but preempted local 
control.156 The Act explicitly required local governments to include 
hydrofracking as a permitted use in all zoning districts. This Act, in 
turn, was invalidated by Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, which 
held that it failed to protect neighboring property owners from harm 
and made irrational land use classifications.157 The power of 
municipalities to adopt comprehensive plans and to separate land uses 
through zoning, and the derivative rights of landowners, in the 
Robinson court’s view, trumped state oil and gas legislation that, on 
its face, preempted local regulation.  
Under the former Oil and Gas Act in Pennsylvania, municipalities 
were permitted to regulate the location of wells within their boundaries 
through zoning, but were not allowed to ban wells outright:  
Except with respect to local ordinances adopted pursuant to the 
. . . Municipalities Planning Code (“MPC”) and the . . . Flood 
Plain Management Act, all local ordinances and enactments 
purporting to regulate oil and gas well operations regulated by 
the act are hereby superseded. No ordinances or enactments 
adopted pursuant to the aforementioned acts shall contain 
provisions which impose conditions, requirements or limitations 
on the same features of oil and gas well operations regulated by 
 
154. Id. at 14.  
155. Pennsylvania has been called the “Saudi Arabia of Natural Gas.” 
Elizabeth McGowan, Fracking’s Environmental Footprint to Transform 
Pennsylvania Landscape, Reuters (Apr. 25, 2011, 3:30 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/25/idUS308837987220110425. 
156. See 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3303 (West Supp. 2013).  
157. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 484–85 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2012). 
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this act or that accomplish the same purposes as set forth in 
this act. The Commonwealth, by this enactment, hereby 
preempts and supersedes the regulation of oil and gas wells as 
herein defined.158 
The Pennsylvania courts examined the preemptive scope of this 
language in two cases decided on the same day in 2009, Huntley & 
Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont 159 and Range Resources-
Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp.160 In Huntley,161 a drilling company, 
Huntley & Huntley, sought review of a city council decision denying a 
conditional use permit to allow drilling in a single-family residential 
zone.162 The Commonwealth Court held that the locational restrictions 
imposed by the Borough of Oakmont upon Huntley were on the same 
topic as addressed in the Oil and Gas Act, and were, therefore, 
preempted.163 Upon appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sought 
to determine whether the state legislature intended to leave localities 
any latitude to regulate oil and gas wells.164 It reversed the lower 
court by determining that local zoning regulated a different aspect of 
drilling than the Oil and Gas Act: its location rather than the 
technical aspects of drilling.165 The Supreme Court found that the 
particular language of the Act preempts only ordinances that “impose 
conditions, requirements, or limitations on the same features of oil 
and gas well operations,” or that “accomplish the same purposes.”166 
The court accepted the appellants’ contention that the “very essence 
of zoning is the designation of areas where different uses are 
permitted, subject to the appropriate level of municipal review,” and 
 
158. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 601.602 (West 1996) (repealed 2012). 
159. Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2009). 
160. Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869 (Pa. 
2009). 
161. Huntley, 964 A.2d at 855. 
162. Id. at 858. 
163. Id. at 859. 
164. Id. at 863 (“[O]ur interpretive task is to examine the particular wording 
of this provision, together with any other relevant aspect of the statute, 
in order to determine whether the Legislature intended to leave room for 
localities to designate certain zoning districts (such as residential ones) 
where oil and gas wells may be prohibited as a general matter.”).  
165. Id. at 864 (“[We] conclude that, absent further legislative guidance, 
Section 602’s reference to ‘features of oil and gas well operations 
regulated by this act’ pertains to technical aspects of well functioning 
and matters ancillary thereto (such as registration, bonding, and well 
site restoration), rather than the well’s location.” (quoting 58 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 601.602 (1996))). 
166. Id. at 863 (quoting 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 601.602 (1996)).  
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that the legislature explicitly sought to preserve local zoning power by 
distinguishing the “technical features of oil and gas operations.”167 
The court in Huntley found that the state’s interest primarily 
centered on the efficient extraction and utilization of the state’s 
increasingly valuable natural resource.168 In contrast, it noted that the 
borough’s core interests emanate from police power objectives 
designed to protect public safety and welfare: “preserving the 
character of residential neighborhoods, and encouraging ‘beneficial 
and compatible land uses.’ ”169 In finding that these interests did not 
overlap, the court adopted a holding from the Colorado high court: 
While the governmental interests involved in oil and gas 
development and in land-use control at times may overlap, the 
core interests in the legitimate governmental functions are quite 
distinct. The state’s interest in oil and gas development is 
centered primarily on the efficient production and utilization of 
the natural resources in the state. A county’s interest in land-
use control, in contrast, is one of orderly development and use 
of land in a manner consistent with local demographic and 
environmental concerns. Given the rather distinct nature of 
these interests, we reasonably may expect that any legislative 
intent to prohibit a county from exercising its land-use 
authority over those areas of the county in which oil 
development or operations are taking place or are contemplated 
would be clearly and unequivocally stated. We, however, find no 
such clear and unequivocal statement of legislative intent in the 
Oil and Gas Conservation Act.170 
Thus, while the court acknowledges the presence of some overlap in 
purposes, the salient objectives of the local and state governments, it 
found, do not conflict.171 
In Range Resources, decided on the same day as Huntley, the 
court invalidated a local law that regulated the operations of drilling 
rather than its location, holding that this aspect of hydrofracking 
regulation was preempted by the Oil and Gas Act.172 The court 
identified numerous examples of “substantive[ ] overlap” within the 
ordinance in question, such as:  
 
167. Id. at 860. 
168. Id. at 864–65 (quoting 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 601.102 (1996)).  
169. Id. at 865. 
170. Id. (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc., 830 
P.2d 1045, 1057 (Colo. 1992)). 
171. Id. at 866. 
172. Range Res. Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 877 (Pa. 
2009). 
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permitting procedures specifically for oil and gas wells, . . . 
bonding requirements before drilling can begin, . . . 
regulat[ion of] well heads, including the capping of the same 
once they are no longer in use, . . . regulat[ion of] site 
restoration after drilling operations cease, . . . [and] the 
requirement of restoring nearby streets to their pre-drilling 
conditions regardless of whether the wear and tear on such 
roadways was caused by vehicles associated with drilling 
activities.173  
 
Indeed, the court concluded that many of the restrictions imposed 
by the ordinance were “even more stringent than the corresponding 
provisions of the Act.”174 Thus, the court found that the ordinance in 
question was “qualitatively different” from the corresponding 
ordinance in Huntley, which “sought only to control the location of 
wells consistent with established zoning principles.”175 
Since the ordinance not only sought to regulate the same features 
as the Oil and Gas Act, but also created regulatory obstacles to 
effective implementation of the Act, the court held that the doctrine 
of “conflict preemption” applied.176 The ordinance “reflect[ed] an 
attempt by the Township to enact a comprehensive regulatory scheme 
relative to oil and gas development within the municipality” and, as 
such, was preempted by the Oil and Gas Act.177 
Following the Huntley and Range Resources decisions, the 
Pennsylvania legislature replaced the Oil and Gas Act with Act 13, 
containing a revised statutory framework for oil and gas regulation.178 
The Act explicitly preempted local zoning from regulating hydrofracking, 
except with respect to setback requirements in limited areas.179 The Act 
states: 
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, environmental 
acts are of Statewide concern and, to the extent that they 
regulate oil and gas operations, occupy the entire field of 
regulation, to the exclusion of all local ordinances. The 
Commonwealth by this section, preempts and supersedes the 
 
173. Id. at 875–76. 
174. Id. at 875. 
175. Id. at 876. 
176. Id. at 877 (citing Nutter v. Dougherty, 938 A.2d 401, 404 (Pa. 2007)). 
177. Id. at 875. 
178. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2301–3504 (West Supp. 2013). 
179. Id. § 3303. 
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local regulation of oil and gas operations regulated by the 
environmental acts, as provided in this chapter.180 
While Act 13 ostensibly preserves the municipality’s right to 
enact local zoning ordinances, it prohibits local zoning ordinances 
from conflicting with chapter 32, which regulates oil and gas 
operations.181 Among other restrictions imposed upon municipalities, 
the Act requires localities to amend zoning to include oil and gas 
operations in all zoning districts.182 This conformity requirement 
creates an obvious and fundamental conflict with the Municipal 
Planning Code (MPC). The MPC requires municipalities to adopt 
comprehensive plans and to create zoning districts in accordance with 
comprehensive plans.183 Under Act 13, a municipality seeking to shield 
a residential area, for example, from potentially dangerous 
hydrofracking operations in the interest of public health and welfare 
would not be able to do so. 
A collection of seven municipalities, private citizens, and 
environmental groups challenged the constitutionality of Act 13 in 
Robinson Township.184 The municipalities brought a substantive due 
process claim, contending that Act 13 prevented them from creating 
zoning ordinances with a rational connection to their comprehensive 
plans, as required by the MPC, thus preventing them from fulfilling 
their constitutional duty to “protect the health, safety and welfare of 
their citizens.”185 
The court explained that the zoning power was but “an extension 
of the concept of public nuisance which protects owners from 
activities that interfere with use and enjoyment of their property,”186 
citing the seminal Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty case for the idea 
that “[l]and use restrictions aim to prevent problems caused by the 
‘pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.’ ”187 Essentially, the Act 
required municipalities to create zoning incompatible with their 
comprehensive plans; if mining and gas operations were to be included 
 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 482 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2012) (“The MPC requires that every municipality adopt a 
comprehensive plan which, among other things, includes a land use plan 
on how various areas of the community are to be used.”). 
184. Id. at 468 n.3.  
185. Id. at 469. 
186. Id. at 481. 
187. Id. at 481 (quoting Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 
388 (1926)). 
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in all zones, as the Act required, zoning ordinances would inherently 
not comport with their comprehensive plans.188 Thus, the court found, 
the state’s interest in regulating hydrofracking processes sits in direct 
conflict with local zoning interests. When such substantive due 
process conflicts appear, the court held, the judiciary “must accord 
substantial deference to the preservation of rights of property 
owners.”189 The court stated that 
by requiring municipalities to violate their comprehensive plans 
for growth and development, [Act 13] violates substantive due 
process because it does not protect the interests of neighboring 
property owners from harm, alters the character of 
neighborhoods and makes irrational classifications—irrational 
because it requires municipalities to allow all zones, drilling 
operations and impoundments, gas compressor stations, storage 
and use of explosives in all zoning districts, and applies 
industrial criteria to restrictions on height of structures, 
screening and fencing, lighting and noise.190 
Following the Robinson decision, and pending the decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on appeal,191 hydrofracking regulation in 
Pennsylvania has reverted to the doctrine established in Huntley and 
Range Resources. The courts in Pennsylvania, working with different 
but seemingly preemptive state oil and gas statutes, came to roughly 
the same result as the courts in New York. In both states, the judges 
have found ways to harmonize the power of local governments to 
adopt local land use restrictions on hydrofracking to promote local 
interests with the power of the state to standardize the regulation of 
the gas drilling industry.  
IV. West Virginia and Ohio: Hydrofracking Law in Limbo 
A. West Virginia Gas Regulation and Local Land Use Control 
In West Virginia, the power to adopt land use plans and zoning is 
delegated to counties and incorporated municipalities. Most densely 
 
188. Id. at 480–81 (“[T]he municipalities contend that Act 13 . . . forces 
municipalities to enact zoning ordinances . . . allowing, among other 
things, mining and gas operations in all zoning districts which are 
incompatible with the municipalities’ comprehensive plans that 
denominates different zoning districts, making zoning irrational.”).  
189. Id. at 482 (quoting In re Appeal of Realen Valley Forge Greenes 
Assocs., 838 A.2d 718, 728 (Pa. 2003)). 
190. Id. at 484. 
191. Pennslyania appealed the Commonwealth Court’s ruling striking down 
portions Act 13. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard oral argument 
on October 17, 2012. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, No. 63 MAP 
2012 (Pa. 2013). 
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settled incorporated municipalities, such as the City of Morgantown, 
have adopted land use plans and zoning, and some have used it to 
prevent or limit hydrofracking. Morgantown, in fact, exercised its 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under state law and banned hydrofracking 
within a mile of its borders.192 In 2011, a lower state court in West 
Virginia invalidated this local antifracking law, holding that the state 
had completely preempted the field with respect to oil and gas law.193 
The court noted that “[t]hese regulations do not provide any 
exception or latitude to permit the City of Morgantown to impose a 
complete ban on fracking or to regulate oil and gas development and 
production.”194  
Does this lower court opinion leave open the prospect of local 
regulation that allows but limits gas drilling, particularly in light of 
the fact that state gas regulation standards do not consider many of 
the local impacts traditionally governed by zoning? In 2012, the 
Morgantown City Council tested this notion by amending its zoning 
law to prohibit gas drilling within certain distances of schools, houses 
of worship, hospitals, and residential neighborhoods.195 This latest 
amendment raises interesting questions about the exercise of state and 
local power in West Virginia. 
Regarding environmental protection generally, West Virginia 
statutes indicate that “[t]he state has the primary responsibility for 
protecting the environment; other governmental entities, public and 
private organizations and our citizens have the primary responsibility 
of supporting the state in its role as protector of the environment.”196 
Statutes provide that the job of the State Department of 
Environmental Protection is to “consolidate environmental regulatory 
programs in a single state agency,” while also providing a 
“comprehensive program for the conservation, protection, exploration, 
development, enjoyment and use of the natural resources of the State 
of West Virginia.”197 Case law establishes that “where an ordinance is 
 
192. Ne. Nat. Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 
3584376, at *1 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011).  
193. Ne. Nat. Energy, 2011 WL 3584376, at *9 (“[T]he State’s interest in oil 
and gas development and production throughout the State as set forth 
in the W. Va. Code § 22-6 et seq. (1994), provides for the exclusive 
control of this area of law to be within the hands of the WVDEP.”). 
194. Id.  
195. Morgantown Will Try to Zone Out Most Gas Drilling, ShaleReporter 
(June 4, 2012, 12:15 AM), http://www.shalereporter.com/government/ 
article_7dd089a4-adc0-11e1-8543-0019bb30f31a.html. 
196. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-1-1(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2009). 
197. Id. § 22-1-1(b)(2)–(3). 
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in conflict with a state law the former is invalid.”198 The principle is so 
fundamental that “citation of authorities is unnecessary.”199 
State statutes delegate responsibility for regulating oil and gas to 
the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).200 The DEP’s 
Office of Oil and Gas (OOG) is “responsible for monitoring and 
regulating all actions related to the exploration, drilling, storage and 
production of oil and natural gas.”201 OOG inspectors are authorized to 
issue orders demanding that wells cease operations if there is a violation 
or potential violation and imminent danger to humans or freshwater 
sources.202 Class II well operators are required to permanently dispose of 
wastewater,203 most of which is handled through underground injection 
regulated under the state’s UIC program.204  
This less than comprehensive regulatory scheme generated 
criticism of the state’s response to hydrofracking, leading the governor 
to supplement legislative standards with executive requirements. 
Under Executive Order 4-11, Governor Earl Ray Tomblin instructed 
the DEP to issue emergency rules requiring certain gas wells to be 
accompanied by an erosion and sediment control plan as well as a site 
construction plan, both of which are to be approved by a registered 
professional engineer.205 The order also required a site-specific well 
safety plan and set minimum standards for well construction.206 It 
further required that an applicant for a well permit submit a water 
management plan if the well uses more than 210,000 gallons of water 
monthly.207 Information required to be submitted with this plan 
includes the type of water source, the anticipated withdrawal volume, 
the anticipated months during which withdrawal would occur, the 
planned management for the processing or disposal of wastewater, and 
 
198. Vector Co. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 184 S.E.2d 301, 304 (W. Va. 
1971). 
199. Id. 
200. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6-2(a). 
201. W. Va. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, Office of Oil and Gas, 
http://www.dep.wv.gov/oil-and-gas/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2013). 
202. W. Va. Code § 22-6-3(a). 
203. Press Release, W. Va. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, Industry Guidance, 
Gas Well Drilling/Completion, Large Water Volume Fracture 
Treatments, at 1, 4 (Jan. 8, 2010).  
204. Pam Kasey, Pa. W.Va. Address Salt Problems Differently, St. J. 
(Charleston, W. Va.), Jan. 8, 2010, available at http://www.uppermon.org/ 
news/charleston/SJ-Salt_Regulation-8Jan10.html. 
205. W. Va. Exec. Order No. 4-11, ¶ 4(a) (July 12, 2011). 
206. Id. ¶ 4(d). 
207. Id. ¶ 4(c). 
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the anticipated additives in the hydrofracking fluid.208 Operators are 
also required to record the quantity and method of management of 
flowback water.209 Finally, operators must provide public notice for 
any well to be located within the boundaries of a municipality. The 
notice is to include the well’s location, the expected date that the 
drilling will begin, and the operator’s contact information.210 
The West Virginia legislature’s response to criticism of the 
regulatory system was to adopt the Marcellus Shale Hydrofracking 
Rules Bill in 2012, which significantly increased permit fees and 
required gas wells to be set back at least 250 feet from a water well, 
300 feet from a natural trout stream, 625 feet from occupied houses, 
and 1,000 feet from a public water supply intake.211 Well operators 
under this Bill must also maintain at least 100 feet between wells and 
other water sources.212 The DEP was given the power to grant 
variances from these standards under certain circumstances.213 
In reviewing Morgantown’s new regulations on hydrofracking, or 
those of any other zoning municipality in West Virginia, the judiciary 
will be challenged to determine whether these enactments of the state 
legislature, as supplemented by the Governor’s executive order, 
occupy the field and preempt local regulation. Prior case law 
recognized the different aspects of business that are subject to both 
state and local regulation.214 There is a strong argument that the 
interests protected by West Virginia planning and zoning statutes 
extend far beyond the interests protected by existing hydrofracking 
regulation. This is evident in the language of the legislation adopted 
by the state legislature delegating planning and zoning authority to 
incorporated municipalities and counties.215 
 
208. Id. 
209. Id. ¶ 4(f)(iii)(1)(a). 
210. Id. ¶ 4(g). 
211. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6A-12(a)–(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
212. Id. 
213. Id. (“[T]he well operator may be granted a variance by the secretary 
from these distance restrictions upon submission of a plan which 
identifies the sufficient measures, facilities or practices to be employed 
during well site construction, drilling and operations.”). 
214. See Longwell v. Hodge, 297 S.E.2d 820, 825 (W. Va. 1982) (upholding 
regulation of the location of a beer-selling restaurant under zoning, 
despite the fact that the establishment was regulated by state law; the 
purposes of the two regulatory regimes were different and no conflict 
was found). 
215. W. Va. Code Ann. § 8A-3-7 (LexisNexis 2012) (setting forth 
comprehensive requirements for the submission of a comprehensive plan 
by the planning commission).  
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These state statutes provide that the purpose of a comprehensive 
plan is to guide the local legislature so that it can accomplish the 
coordinated and compatible development of land and improvements 
within its jurisdiction.216 The comprehensive plan is defined as  
a process through which citizen participation and thorough 
analysis are used to develop a set of strategies that establish as 
clearly and practically as possible the best and most appropriate 
future development of the area under the jurisdiction of the 
planning commission. A comprehensive plan aids the planning 
commission in designing and recommending to the governing 
body ordinances that result in preserving and enhancing the 
unique quality of life and culture in that community and in 
adapting to future changes of use of an economic, physical or 
social nature.217 
Under the statute, additional purposes of the comprehensive plan 
are to  
(1) Set goals and objectives for land development . . .  
(3) Coordinate all governing bodies, units of government and 
other planning commissions to ensure that all comprehensive 
plans and future development are compatible;  
(4) Create conditions favorable to health, safety, mobility, 
transportation, prosperity, civic activities, recreational, 
educational, cultural opportunities and historic resources; . . . 
(7) Promote a sense of community, character, and identity; [and] 
(8) Promote the efficient utilization of natural resources, rural 
land, agricultural land and scenic areas . . . .218 
Zoning ordinances under these West Virginia statutes are to be 
adopted to promote the public welfare, health, safety, comfort, and 
morals of the community, preserve historic landmarks and buildings, 
preserve agricultural land, and promote the orderly development of 
the land.219 These provisions allow local zoning to regulate the use of 
the land, prohibit specific land uses, protect and enhance the physical 
qualities of the community, divide the community into different zones 
 
216. Id. § 8A-3-1(a) (“The general purpose of a comprehensive plan is to 
guide a governing body to accomplish a coordinated and compatible 
development of land and improvements within its territorial jurisdiction, 
in accordance with present and future needs and resources.”). 
217. Id. § 8A-3-1(b). 
218. Id. § 8A-3-1(d).  
219. Id. § 8A-3-2(b). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Hydrofracking: State Preemption, Local Power, and Cooperative Governance 
1031 
for regulating the use of the land, create overlay districts and special 
design districts within which specific additional development 
standards will apply, regulate the height, area, bulk, use, and 
architectural features of buildings, preserve green spaces, and require 
new green spaces, landscaping, screening, and the preservation of 
adequate natural light. 
It is a fair question to ask whether the same legislature that 
adopted this detailed and broad legislative regime to provide for the 
appropriate use of the land at the local level intended to fully 
preempt its exercise by the adoption of the oil and gas laws, which 
focus on a much more limited set of impacts. Since the only case law 
in West Virginia to date involves a complete ban on hydrofracking 
and is a lower court opinion, it is possible that a full review of both 
legislative schemes by a higher court will reveal a path for 
harmonizing them both, as the courts did in New York and 
Pennsylvania. This possibility is furthered by the legislature’s reversal 
of the former rule of strict construction of local land use laws.220 
B. Ohio 
In Ohio, the issue of state preemption of local land use control of 
gas drilling was squarely addressed in Newbury Township Board of 
Trustees v. Lomak Petroleum, Inc.221 Under the authority granted to 
it to plan and regulate development, the township amended its zoning 
ordinance to prohibit drilling in all residential areas.222 In doing so, it 
relied on a long tradition of local zoning in the state.223 In 1925, the 
Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of municipal zoning, 
finding that local zoning helps to maintain the welfare of the 
community.224 The power to plan, zone, and regulate land use is 
 
220. See id. § 8-1-7 (instructing courts to review local land use authority 
fairly broadly). The section declares that the “enumeration of powers 
and authority granted in this chapter shall not operate to exclude the 
exercise of other powers and authority fairly incidental thereto or 
reasonably implied and within the purposes of this chapter . . . [and t]he 
provisions of this chapter shall be given full effect without regard to the 
common-law rule of strict construction.” Id. 
221. Newbury Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Lomak Petrol., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 302 
(Ohio 1992). 
222. Id. at 306 (holding that a township may prohibit drilling in residential 
areas for legitimate health and safety concerns).  
223. Id. (noting that the township zoning resolution in this case did not 
adopt health and safety standards, which conflicted with state law that 
prevented prohibition of drilling in appropriate areas, unless for health 
or safety reasons).  
224. Pritz v. Messer, 149 N.E. 30, 35 (Ohio 1925). This case preceded Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), which affirmed the 
constitutionality of local zoning, and particularly its separation of land 
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vested in the state’s General Assembly pursuant to the Ohio 
Constitution.225 Through its home-rule provisions and enabling 
statutes, the Ohio legislature and courts have given significant police 
power and planning authority to regulate land use to the local 
legislatures of counties, townships, and municipalities.226 
The Ohio Oil and Gas Act, chapter 1509, however, expressly 
prohibits certain local land use restrictions, while allowing localities to 
adopt zoning restrictions that are designed to protect the public from 
the health and safety risks of drilling.227 The Newbury court noted that  
the General Assembly had no desire to totally strip local 
governments . . . of the power to regulate activities within their 
borders. [Ohio Revised Code] Chapter 1509 attempts to strike a 
balance between those aspects of oil and gas well exploration 
and drilling which are reserved for state regulation and those 
areas which local governments . . . may permissibly regulate.228 
Despite this recognition of local zoning power over hydrofracking, 
the court in Newbury invalidated the total restriction of drilling in all 
residential districts.229 It noted that the residential zoning districts in 
the township included significant amounts of agricultural lands—areas 
where gas companies traditionally drill.230 The court also noted that 
there were no agricultural zoning districts in the township, recognized 
that a significant amount of land in the residential districts was not 
developed residentially, and questioned whether the blanket 
restriction truly was motivated by public health and safety 
 
uses, drawing on nuisance law as an analogy, and basing its holding in 
part on protecting public health and safety. 
225. Ohio Const. art. II, § 1. 
226. See Vill. of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Ohio 1984) 
(noting “that the right of the individual to use and enjoy his private 
property is not unbridled but is subject to the legitimate exercise of the 
local police power”); see also Euclid, 272 U.S. 365; Morris v. Roseman, 
118 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954) (“The enacting of a zoning 
ordinance is clearly an exercise of the police power of a municipality in 
protecting the public morals, safety, health and general welfare of the 
people.”). 
227. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.39 (West 1996). 
228. Newbury Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Lomak Petroleum, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 302, 
304 (Ohio 1992). “[Ohio Revised Code] 1509.39 preempts the power of a 
township to prohibit oil or gas well drilling in areas which are traditionally 
appropriate for such activity, unless health and safety standards are being 
adopted by the township zoning resolution.” Id. at 306. 
229. Id. at 306. 
230. Id. at 305. 
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concerns.231 The effect of banning hydrofracking in residential zones in 
a town with only three zoning districts—residential, commercial, and 
industrial—was to confine the practice to a small portion of the 
community.232 On the strength of this logic, the court invalidated the 
restriction.233  
The court remanded for further consideration of the issue of 
whether provisions of the local law that prohibited drilling within 300 
feet of an inhabited structure protected public health and safety. 
Objecting to the remand, a concurring justice noted that “the 
majority imposes an even higher level of scrutiny to determine 
whether this regulation passes statutory muster . . . . [W]e need only 
determine whether it rationally promotes township health and safety, 
not whether it is narrowly tailored to address such concerns.”234 
This decision, de facto, prevents Newbury Township from 
preserving its agricultural lands for future residential use, since homes 
are not likely to be developed in and around a number of gas drilling 
facilities. Beyond that, the Newbury decision imposes a duty upon 
local legislatures, in adopting hydrofracking restrictions, to prove that 
they accomplish public health and safety objectives. This reverses the 
traditional deferential posture of the courts in reviewing decisions of 
legislatures, particularly with regard to zoning matters. From its 
inception, zoning determinations by local legislatures have been 
subjected to a rational basis test, which this decision reversed.235 
The practical impact of Newbury is that local governments in 
Ohio must adduce some evidence or argument as to how 
hydrofracking regulations protect the public health and safety before 
they adopt them.236 How, for example, could the township have 
 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 306 (“Because Section 801.0 A of the Newbury Township Zoning 
Resolution is not an attempt to further health and safety goals, we find 
that Section 801.0 A conflicts with, and therefore is preempted by, state 
law.”). 
234. Id. at 309 (Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
235. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (“If 
these reasons, thus summarized, do not demonstrate the wisdom or 
sound policy in all respects of those [zoning] restrictions . . . at least, the 
reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be 
said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such 
provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”). 
236. This assertion, if correct, questions the validity of the October 1, 2012, 
adoption by the City Council of Yellow Springs of a Bill of Rights 
ordinance banning shale gas drilling and associated activities. Bob 
Downing, Ohio’s Yellow Springs Adopts Community Bill of Rights, 
Akron Beacon J. Online (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.ohio.com/blogs/ 
drilling/ohio-utica-shale-1.291290/ohio-s-yellow-springs-adopts-community-
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proved that prohibiting hydrofracking in its extensive residential 
districts was motivated by such concerns? On the one hand, this may 
mean that local governments must identify, understand, and rely on 
the public health and environmental risks that attend hydrofracking 
and import enough of that science to support their decisions. 
Alternatively, localities may be able to demonstrate that their 
antifracking laws are motivated by public health and safety concerns 
by referring to existing case law in the state and the constitutional 
and statutory provisions that these cases reference.  
Taking this latter approach, could Newbury demonstrate that 
preserving a large part of the township for current agricultural and 
future residential use protects local health and safety? On point is 
Ketchel v. Bainsbridge Township,237 in which the Ohio Supreme Court 
found that a three-acre minimum lot size requirement in a residential 
zone was a valid requirement in order to protect underground aquifers 
from being depleted by the demands brought about through 
subdivision of denser, smaller lots.238 Such a purpose is clearly tied to 
protecting local public health and safety. The court ruled that “a local 
zoning authority may consider the conservation of underground water 
resources when enacting zoning regulations.”239  
The connection under Ohio law between protecting the public 
health, safety, and welfare and preserving natural resources is 
extraordinarily clear. The Ohio Constitution provides that 
conservation, preservation, and revitalization are legitimate “public 
purposes” and vests local governments with the authority to engage in 
the “conservation and preservation of natural and open areas” and to 
“control, prevent or minimize, clean up or remediate . . . water 
contamination or pollution.”240 Among the strategies that 
 
bill-of-rights-1.338971. Yellow Springs joins twelve other localities in 
Pennsylvania and New York in passing similar local legislation. Megan 
Bachman, Council Considers Drilling Ordinance—Ban Would Be First 
in Ohio, Yellow Springs News (Aug. 9, 2012), http://ysnews.com/ 
news/2012/08/council-considers-drilling-ordinance%E2%80%94-ban-would-
be-first-in-ohio. How can such municipalities support a total ban based 
on public health and safety concerns? There may be responsible answers 
to this question, but supporting such ordinances is certainly a heavier 
lift than supporting, for example, set-back restrictions such as those 
adopted in Newbury.  
237. Ketchel v. Bainsbridge Twp., 557 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio 1990).  
238. Id. at 785. 
239. Id. at 783. 
240. Ohio Const. art. VIII, § 2o (authorizing local government entities to 
provide for the “conservation and preservation of natural and open areas 
and farmlands, including by making urban areas more desirable or 
suitable for development and revitalization; to control, prevent, 
minimize, clean up, or remediate certain contamination of or pollution 
from lands in the state and water contamination or pollution.”); see also 
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municipalities in Ohio can consider in the wake of the Newbury 
decision is to create conservation or environmental zones in lieu of 
residential holding zones. This is because zoning laws may be enacted 
for the protection of the environment or conservation of natural 
resources.241 This has been held to be a legitimate exercise of the 
police powers granted to municipalities, counties, and townships to 
protect the local public health, safety, and welfare.242 In Cash v. 
Cincinnati Board of Zoning Appeals,243 the Ohio Court of Appeals 
found that the purposes of a Cincinnati Environmental Quality-
Hillside District advanced the public safety, health, and welfare.244 In 
Reed v. Rootstown Twp. Board of Zoning Appeals,245 the Ohio 
Supreme Court sustained an application of an Open Space 
Conservation District, which established a five-acre minimum lot 
requirement for a swampy area in order to protect the ecological 
balances and conserve natural resources.246 The Ohio Supreme Court 
had held that such conservation districts were a reasonable and 
legitimate use of police power by the township.247 
 
Ohio Const. art. II, § 36 (“Laws may be passed to encourage forestry 
and agriculture . . . and to authorize the acquiring of other lands for 
that purpose . . . [and] to provide for the conservation of the natural 
resources of the state, including streams, lakes, submerged and swamp 
lands and the development and regulation of water power and the 
formation of drainage and conservation districts; and to provide for the 
regulation of methods of mining, weighing, measuring and marketing 
coal, oil, gas and all other minerals.”). This constitutional provision 
gives local governments great leeway in protecting and promoting the 
conservation of natural resources through the use of land use regulations 
and devices. 
241. See Ketchel, 557 N.E.2d at 783 (noting that resources such as 
groundwater must be conserved and protected). 
242. See Reed v. Rootstown Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 458 N.E.2d 840, 
842 (Ohio 1984) (holding that the requirements and purposes of a 
township zoning resolution were “reasonable and legitimate exercise[s] of 
police power”). 
243. Cash v. Cincinnati Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 690 N.E.2d 593 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1996). 
244. Id. at 597. The purposes of the Cincinnati Environmental Quality-
Hillside District are “to assist the development of land and structures to 
be compatible with the environment and to protect the quality of the 
urban environment in those locations where the characteristics of the 
environment are of significant public value and are vulnerable to 
damage by development permitted under conventional zoning and 
building regulations.” Id. at 595. 
245. Reed, 458 N.E.2d 840. 
246. Id. at 842.  
247. Id. at 840. 
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These innovative zoning techniques exhibit the strength of the 
power delegated to local governments and suggest a path toward 
demonstrating that public health and safety concerns motivate zoning 
provisions that limit hydrofracking. Such a strategy is bolstered by 
the general understanding of local power under Ohio law. The Home 
Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, for example, states that 
“[m]unicipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local 
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such 
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in 
conflict with general laws.”248  
V. Cooperative Governance: State-Local Collaboration 
There is tension in the four Marcellus Shale states regarding 
regulatory control of gas drilling. Debates take on an “either-or” 
character, with advocates arguing to elbow out the level of 
government they think least likely to meet their interests.249 Now that 
the power of New York towns to ban hydrofracking has been upheld 
on appeal, those who oppose hydrofracking may fan the flames of 
local resistance, encouraging others to follow suit. If they are 
successful in this, the industry and those who will benefit from its 
relatively cheap energy will lobby for Act 13–type solutions in the 
form of new state legislation clearly preempting local regulation.  
Rather than ask which level of government should win the battle 
for control of gas drilling, it is far preferable to ask how both state 
and local officials and stakeholders can be involved.250 As this Article 
demonstrates, zoning is an important tool in the municipal 
governance toolkit and should not be sacrificed for the sake of 
 
248. Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 3. 
249. This discussion presupposes that the federal government will remain 
gridlocked legislatively and that Congress will permit only modest 
interventions by the EPA, beyond those mentioned in Part I. Both state 
and local governments would benefit from more aggressive federal 
action, including funding much-needed scientific research regarding the 
public health and environmental impacts of hydrofracking and fully 
integrating the gas drilling industry into the coverage of federal clean air 
and water protections.  
250. See Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Environmental 
Decisions in the Face of Uncertainty 139 (2013) (“Agency 
decision-making processes that involve stakeholders, including dialogues 
with stakeholders about uncertainties, can demonstrate intentional 
transparency and create, maintain, and enhance a relationship of trust 
between the agency and stakeholders . . . . Early and continuous 
involvement of stakeholders can also prevent delays that can occur when 
stakeholders are not engaged in decision making until later in the 
process, at which time they might take legal actions.”) “Stakeholders” is 
defined in this document to include communities. Id. at 139 n.8. 
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streamlining the gas drilling permitting process. Zoning out 
hydrofracking, on the other hand, may frustrate important state 
interests, particularly if it becomes widespread. Gas reserves 
transcend local boundaries and states have a legitimate interest in 
promoting an adequate supply of energy sources of their choice. These 
tensions cannot be resolved in winner-take-all litigation or advocacy 
in legislative offices and chambers. They require a concerted effort to 
negotiate a process and create a framework for decision making that 
provides a role for both local and state agencies and their 
stakeholders.  
The result of such a process might be an agreement by the state 
to promulgate model zoning ordinances, such as a gas exploration 
overlay zone,251 and provide technical assistance to localities in how to 
adapt such ordinances to their local circumstances. It may be that 
communities adopt total bans in part because they do not have access 
to best practices such as these or the understanding of both the law 
and science necessary to employ them. State agencies that are 
investing time and money in creating their own regulatory regimes 
can cost effectively provide such technical assistance to localities as 
part of a cooperative state-local approach to controlling local impacts 
and promoting regional and statewide interests.  
In New York, the DEC has proposed giving communities with an 
adopted comprehensive plan component on gas drilling a method of 
becoming involved in the permitting process.252 The proposal is to 
require an applicant for a gas drilling permit in a town with a 
hydrofracking component of its comprehensive plan to negotiate with 
local officials to conform the drilling to the plan, prior to the DEC’s 
final decision on the permit.253 But how are localities with limited 
professional staff going to draft an accurate and reasonable 
comprehensive plan component on hydrofracking, with its multiple 
and complex impacts? Such a plan should discuss and assess all 
environmental and public health risks, as well as the adverse impacts 
on the particular community’s character and environment. State 
agencies that are charged with regulating the oil and gas industries 
can be tasked with providing information to localities to help them 
draft well-informed and appropriate planning documents. This 
 
251. See Robert H. Frelich & Neil M. Popowitz, Oil and Gas Fracking: State 
and Federal Regulation Does Not Preempt Needed Local Government 
Regulation, 44 Urb. Law. 533, 556–57 (2012) (discussing the oil and gas 
element of the Santa Fe County Sustainable Land Development Plan, 
which “can be used as a local government model for similar planning 
and regulation in cities and counties where oil and gas drilling and 
hydrological fracturing permits are requested, in coordination with and 
supplemental to permits issued under state oil and gas legislation.”).  
252. Revised Draft SGEIS, supra note 3, at 26–27. 
253. Id.  
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information could also guide communities in identifying measures that 
can mitigate the adverse impacts of gas drilling. 
One model for state-local cooperative governance is New York’s 
law on siting major electric generating facilities, which preempts local 
control of utility siting but accommodates the local interest in the 
permitting system it created.254 This law reauthorized and revised 
article X of the Public Service Law, establishing an electric generation 
siting board to review and approve the siting of electric utility 
generators of twenty-five megawatts or greater.255 This board is 
empowered to override local land use laws that it believes are 
unreasonably burdensome,256 but it includes two members who are 
residents of the affected community.257 Prior to the adoption of this 
law and following the expiration of a previous version of article X, 
localities governed this land use and often opposed or significantly 
delayed the approval of generation plants vitally needed by the state’s 
power grid. In establishing a state-controlled siting system, the 
legislature largely preempted local control but allowed for the input of 
the affected locality and local stakeholders.258 In addition to requiring 
local residents to sit on the siting board, the revised article X requires 
applicants to set up a fund that will enable affected local 
governments, environmental groups, and the community at large to 
hire experts, lawyers, and other consultants to participate in the 
process of creating a scope of review for the proposed utility.259 
Applicants are encouraged to enter into agreements with these parties 
regarding the scope of review and a hearing examiner is appointed to 
resolve any disputes that arise over the scoping.260 While it does not 
impose a collaborative decision-making process on affected agencies, 
governments, and private actors, this legislative approach sets the 
table and provides significant resources so that one can occur. 
There are many more such techniques that could be agreed upon 
if states pursued the intentional policy of including and working with 
local governments in the regulation of hydrofracking, followed by 
serious negotiations to create a framework and practices for working 
together.261 Such a policy would avoid the uncertainty and vagaries of 
 
254. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law §§ 160–173 (McKinney 2011 & Supp. 2013).  
255. Id. § 162. 
256. Id. § 168(3)(e). 
257. Id. § 160(4). 
258. Id. § 166(j), (k). 
259. Id. § 163(4)(a). 
260. Id. § 163(5). 
261. These rather modest suggestions build on a sophisticated strategy 
referred to as reflexive law regimes. Commentators in the field of 
reflexive law, which this Article refers to as cooperative government, 
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preemption debates and litigation, respect the critical role of local 
governments in controlling land uses within their jurisdictions, offer 
them the technical assistance they need to determine where 
hydrofracking can occur and how to guard against its adverse 
impacts, and avoid simplistic solutions such as complete proscriptions 
that may be inimical to larger state interests. 
 
suggest that positive or formal lawmaking, where higher orders of 
government create and impose standards on lower-order governments 
and constituents, is not up to the task of managing highly complex, 
multifaceted problems such as hydrofracking, with its many local, state, 
and federal benefits and potential adverse impacts. They offer 
procedural solutions: reflexive laws that prescribe or suggest decision-
making processes that involve government agencies and private sector 
and civic stakeholders in developing and achieving performance-based 
solutions. Such laws encourage reciprocal reflection within and among 
governmental agencies, regulated entities, and involved stakeholders 
about their performance regarding complex issues like those raised by 
the challenge of governing hydrofracking. For more on reflexive laws, see 
generally Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New 
Doors for State Housing Regulations While Localism Persists, 82 Or. L. 
Rev. 433, 475 n.148 (2003); Sanford E. Gaines, Reflexive Law as a Legal 
Paradigm for Sustainable Development, 10 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 1 (2003); 
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227 
(1995); John C. Dernbach, Navigating the U.S. Transition to 
Sustainability: Matching National Governance Challenges with 
Appropriate Legal Tools, 44 Tulsa L. Rev. 93 (2008); Clayton P. 
Gillette, Allocating Government for Disaster Mitigation, in Losing 
Ground: A Nation on Edge 251 (John R. Nolon & Daniel B. 
Rodriguez eds., 2007). 
  
 
   
